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February 4, 2005
just war theory
I've been thinking about just war theory, mainly because my colleagues and I discussed a good paper on that topic by Judy Lichtenberg today, but also because of Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis' recent comments ("Actually, it's a lot of fun to fight. You know, it's a hell of a hoot. It's fun to shoot some people. I'll be right upfront with you, I like brawling. ... You go into Afghanistan, you got guys who slap women around for five years because they didn't wear a veil. ...You know, guys like that ain't got no manhood left anyway. So it's a hell of a lot of fun to shoot them.")
Just war theory, with its roots in medieval Christian theology, traditionally separates jus ad bellum from jus in bello. The former deals with justifications for waging war; the latter, with acceptable behavior during a war. For instance, some would say that a just conflict is one waged in self-defense or one authorized by the Security Council to promote human rights. Meanwhile, just behavior during a war requires, for example, not deliberately harming civilians, protecting captives, and not taking hostages.
These two issues are separated so that even a nation that is waging a just war must restrain its conduct during the conflict; furthermore, even soldiers fighting in an unjust war must obey certain norms. Because of the distinction between the two sets of standards, Nazi officers could be prosecuted for violating the Geneva Conventions, but not for invading Poland. Likewise, high Allied officials could be held accountable (morally, if not legally) for decisions like the firebombing of Dresden, which was an immoral and unnecessary act in the middle of a just, defensive war.
However, separating jus ad bellum from jus in bello raises its own problems. First of all, the separation can excuse professional military people from worrying about the most important question, which is whether they are fighting a legitimate war in the first place. How the Wehrmacht honored the Geneva Convention was a lot less important than its invasion of the USSR, which led to the slaughter of more than 13 million uniformed Soviet soldiers. It seems strange to demand that a German officer risk his career and even his life in defense of the rules of war, but to excuse him from waging that war in the first place.
Second, a lot of the traditional components of jus in bello seem outmoded or indefensible. For instance, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants doesn't always make a moral difference. Soldiers can be completely innocent draftees (or volunteers in a just war), whereas civilians can be causally responsible for wicked conflicts. It is sometimes a moral mistake to say that you may kill people in uniform but not civilians.
Still, there is a chance that positive results come from having separate rules of justice ad bellum and in bello. On the one hand, political decision-makers (including citizens in democracies) should always carefully consider moral issues before they support military action--no matter how professional and ethical their army may be. Meanwhile, professional military people should have an ingrained sense of proper behavior in bello, regardless of the legitimacy of any overall conflict.
It's too much to ask a professional soldier, whether a draftee or a volunteer in the army of a legitimate state, to ask hard moral questions every time he sees an enemy in uniform. There just isn't time; obedience and instinct must take over. But it is good if the soldier's conscience is triggered when he sees a civilian or a prisoner. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants may be somewhat arbitrary; nevertheless, the triggering of a conscience can help prevent atrocities.
This is why we may accept that General Mattis is a good Marine and a useful guy to have on our side in a war, yet we don't want him to tell his men that killing Afghans is enjoyable. His bold and ruthless behavior on the battlefield is acceptable, maybe even admirable, assuming that the war itself is just. But his expressions of enthusiasm for killing members of an alien culture threaten to erode the scruples that should constrain all soldiers in bello.
February 4, 2005 8:39 PM | category: Iraq and democratic theory | Comments
Comments
Manufacturing a weak integrity argument to justify free speech violations...
It started in a federal Court in Pittsburgh and has moved quickly to Colorado Universtity and Iraq. It's a stretch, but political hacks have besieged first amendment free speech protections.
They attempt to combine a provacative essay comparing victims of 911 with Nazi criminals and an emotionally charged General's comments on war, questioning whether such is permissible when the comments may cause damaged to an institution's integrity.
Why?
Because in a Pittsburgh federal court a well connected corporate crony has suggested the novice argument, and the legal question is waddling without any legal precedent in need of an activist court.
Thus the current unexplained campaign against “free speech” appears to be little more than a Madison Avenue scheme to control any discussion of the President’s desire to privatize higher education.
That is, a number of for-profit colleges have faced inquiries, lawsuits and other actions calling into question the way they inflate enrollment to mislead/increase the value of their parent company’s stock.
In the last year, the Career Education Corporation of Hoffman Estates, Ill., has faced lawsuits, from shareholders and students, contending that, among other things, its colleges have inflated enrollment numbers. In addition, F.B.I. agents raided 10 campuses run by ITT Educational Services of Carmel, Ind., looking for similar problems.
But in a Pittsburgh federal court there is a bigger can of worms.
Kaplan, Inc., is wholly own by the Washington Post Company. For-profit postsecondary education has turned the company around and individuals far more powerful than Martha Steward have made millions. However, there is a nominal “Watergate” styled federal court proceeding (scandal) involving campus “free speech,” that could expose the administration’s violation of public trust
In short, I provided the S.E.C., Department of Education, and federal courts information that appears to prove Kaplan inflated the Concord School of Law enrollment, telling investors that the “flagship” of its higher education division has as many as 600 to 1000 or more students.
I also provided evidence to prove apparent violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.
However, in an attempt to protect important icons of the Washington and New York financial/political circle, hacks have been hired to stir a free speech controversy.
But even Stan Chess (En Passant http://lawtv.typepad.com/en_passant/2004/a_question_of_l.html) innocently questioned the obvious - a clear violation of the federal securities laws.
“Kaplan’s Concord School of Law says it’s one of the largest law schools in the country, yet for each administration only about 25 of its graduates sit for the bar exam. What happens to the hundreds of other students in each class?”
What are you willing to do?
February 5, 2005 3:15 PM | Comments (2) | posted by kstreetfriend
About the separation between jus ad bellum and in bello: it "can excuse professional military people from worrying about the most important question, which is whether they are fighting a legitimate war in the first place"; but in a democracy, the military is a tool, subjected to our elected representative, who should worry about the legitimacy of the war. The military, who don't represent the people, should not be in a position to make autonomous decisions about the legitimacy of the war. However, each individual (including the draftees, marines, etc) should ask himself whether the orders he receives are morally legitimate and whether he should obey them.
Second, the "distinction between combatants and non-combatants doesn't always make a moral difference. Soldiers can be completely innocent draftees (or volunteers in a just war), whereas civilians can be causally responsible for wicked conflicts. It is sometimes a moral mistake to say that you may kill people in uniform but not civilians."
The distinction between combatants vs non-combatants is not the same as between people in uniform vs civilians. Civilians taking up arms are combatants. People in uniform, unarmed and waving a white flag are not. You're entitled under international law (I think) to shoot at the first, but not at the second. So the moral difference still stands.
See http://biblioacid.typepad.com/aka/2004/11/princeton_philo.html for a reading of M. Walzer's last book on the subject.
February 6, 2005 4:09 AM | Comments (2) | posted by AKA