the growth of undergraduate public policy majors

Laura Pappano has an article in the syndicated Hechinger Report entitled “Students want hands-on training in the work of democracy. Colleges are answering.” It is mainly about the growth of undergraduate majors in public policy, which often originate in policy schools that traditionally served graduate-level professional students.

In the article, I say:

The focus on experiential learning appeals to today’s students, who tend to be “anxious about whether what they’re studying is going to get them a job, … And public policy seems pretty concrete, like you could work in state government.” Many young people right now are “very alienated from national politics. That’s “going to turn some of them, I think very wisely, to state and local politics [which] they may have been overlooking.”

Public policy majors are growing and spreading. Pappano writes, “Jodi Sandfort, dean of the Evans School of Public Policy & Governance at the University of Washington, whose public service and policy major started last year, said eight students graduated with it last spring — and 118 applied to the major this fall.”

It so happens that I visited the Evans School last week. While I was there, I made an appearance in a large undergraduate course. I acknowledged that federal civil service is only one form of public service. But I added that few young people have been interested in federal jobs during this century, even those who vote to expand federal programs. This is an anomaly: many young people who supported FDR, JFK or LBJ also aspired to work in Washington, and many did. But in ’08, when I asked college students who supported Obama whether they wanted to work for the executive branch, almost none said they were considering it. Nor did students flock to Washington to work for the expanded government led by Joe Biden.

I realize that many students would not want to work for the Trump Administration (although some do), but I invited the University of Washington students to imagine that a 2028 presidential candidate proposes to fill many of the 400,000 federal jobs that have been lost under Trump by hiring idealistic newcomers. Would they follow a generational call to rebuild and renew the civil service?

The other two programs that Pappanno describes are based in the University of Wisconsin’s LaFollette School and in the Olin College of Engineering. I am privileged to be friends with LaFollette’s Amber Wichowsky and Olin’s Erhardt Graeff (both mentioned in the article), each of whom took a summer institute with me. So this feels like a network.

Undergraduate-level public policy can be compared to Civic Thought curricula, which are often more historical and humanities-based and concerned with a “tradition”; Politics, Philosophy, and Economics (PPE), which is often more contemporary and concerned with questions of political economy; and Civic Studies, which addresses the question “What should we do?” in contrast to the question, “What should the policy be?” In Civic Studies, social movements and voluntary associations are often more prominent than constitutions and governmental institutions.

All of the above are growing these days. I’ve also made a case that Black Studies is a form of Civic Studies. The differences among them are interesting, but a thousand flowers should bloom.


See also a generational call to rebuild; is Black Studies Civic Studies?

a chatbot for civic action

Last spring, I had the pleasure of working with a team of Tufts computer science students who built Sage, a chatbot that can help people who face a threat or consequences of wildfire to “take informed action and work together with their communities to rebuild and move forward.”

The underlying theory is that effective groups need documents: recruitment messages, agendas, budgets, job descriptions, mission statements, and more. An application of a large language model can not only draft such documents but also help people see what documents they need.

Democracy and local communities would be stronger if more groups of concerned people gelled into effective organizations that collected time and money from their own members, used their resources to build their own capacity, made collective decisions, and acted.

I am all for teaching people how to do those things, but it’s unrealistic to offer civic education of this type to millions of adults. An alternative is to help groups organize themselves effectively so that they can focus on the substance of their work. And one way to help them is to draft useful documents.

Since 2025, I have offered a Civic Helpdesk on this site that can help people address any issue. The Tufts students who built Sage chose to focus on one topic, wildfire. They built a considerably more sophisticated application than mine. It is informed by a substantial set of documents that I helped to choose for them, reflecting what I consider good practices for organizing voluntary groups. It favors paid local journalism as its source of information. And it encourages people to get off the AI and interact with other humans.

Sage could be relatively easily repurposed for other issues.

it wasn’t the economy

According to the AP exit polls, “About 4 in 10 U.S. voters nationally say the economy is the most important issue facing the country, as most express concern about gas prices and the cost of groceries.”

This finding does not mean that economic circumstances determined the outcome. For one thing, six in ten respondents had other top priorities. And even for those who picked the economy as the single most important issue, other issues may have influenced their decisions.

But more importantly, the claim that economic performance explains this election–or US elections, in general–is tenuous. The economic statistic that is generally found to correlate best with electoral outcomes is the change in real median household income (i.e., income adjusted for inflation). In the graph that accompanies this post, I show that statistic for election years, along with the change in the vote share of the party that had won the election two years before.

As you would expect, the two lines correlate negatively–lower growth in real income goes along with worse performance for the party that had won the last time. But the correlation is not very high, at -0.33. I also tried some other economic statistics, such as the change in real disposable income one quarter before each election and the change in median household income, but the correlations were even weaker.

It was 1992 when James Carville said, “It’s the economy, stupid.” Indeed, economic discontent probably helped his boss, Bill Clinton, win the White House that year. But the graph shows that real disposable income rose in 1992, yet the incumbent Republican lost the White House and the Democrats lost vote share and nine seats in the House.*

Furthermore, the 2026 election has reduced the correlation between economics and electoral outcomes. I had to use projected or predicted statistics for 2026. I guessed that the annual change in median income, adjusted for inflation, will be +1 percent for this year as a whole. And I guessed that Democrats will take 56% of the national vote when all the ballots are counted. The graph shows that the collapse in Republicans’ vote far exceeds what one would expect from the modest change in real income.

I know that people dislike paying $4/gallon for gasoline. Inflation may also support a broader verdict of broken promises, corruption, and incompetence. But $4/gallon gasoline does not explain one of the biggest swings in electoral support in a half century.**

I want to counter a relatively cynical interpretation–that Americans would have supported a would-be authoritarian president, except that prices happened to rise on his watch. I really don’t think they like this president or what he stands for.


*I acknowledge that a lot of the economic growth happened at the end of 1992, too late to save George H.W. Bush. However, in the second quarter, real disposable income had already risen by 2.8 points, which should have helped him.

**Many would say it’s the biggest swing since 1974. My graph makes it the second-biggest change, because I chose to compare each year to two years prior, not four years prior. There are arguments for either approach.

organizing against data centers–the start of something big?

Anusha Mathur has a very well reported piece in The Washington Sun entitled “How the Data Center Debate Revived Local Politics in 2026.” She describes vivid examples and characters from communities like Festus, MO, “One of the first places, as far as I could tell, where the data center debate sent a jolt of life into an otherwise sleepy local political scene.” There, and in some other places, opposing a local data center has brought people into official politics for the first time and has even had benefits that “extend beyond politics”:

“People are getting together and talking,” [Festus zoning board member Rick] Belleville said. “They’re having barbecues and potlucks, getting to know their neighbors.” In a strange way, data centers have helped revive civic life in Festus. “We have subdivisions of 80 homes, for example, near the proposed site where they never really talked to each other much,” Belleville told me. “Their HOA was falling apart. Now that all 80 people know each other and they’re a real tight-knit community, this has brought them together.”

I’m quoted, saying things like this: “You can’t vote on regulating Silicon Valley. It’s not on the ballot … But if they’re going to build a data center in your community, you could block that. It’s just a leverage point, and once it’s a leverage point, it’s also an organizational opportunity.”

I think that’s true, but the article makes it real.

the tide turns

Two years ago, shortly after the 2024 election, I wrote, “The Tide will Turn.” Now it has.

Napoleon is supposed to have said that morale is ten times more important than physical force in war. Similarly, the number of votes cast for a party and the seats that it wins are less important than the sense that people make of a major political event, such as a momentous election. I think that Americans will draw the conclusion that MAGA has failed, which will influence not only the policy agenda and candidates’ positioning for the 2028 election but also people’s everyday behavior in their communities and institutions.

If you want to predict the political conflict between Congress and the White House between now and 2028, you must consider Trump’s substantial advantages. He can veto bills. The Democrats would need significant defections from the rump group of right-wing Republicans to override him. Until a new budget or significant authorization bills have been enacted, ICE can continue massive raids (it is lavishly funded through FY 2029), and Trump can order offensive military actions in the Gulf and the Caribbean and tilt toward Russia against Ukraine.

In the likely scenario that Trump vetoes a Democratic budget that blocks his priorities, the government will shut down. That will be necessary but genuinely painful, especially if the shutdown persists for a year or more. While most of the government is closed, ICE and the Pentagon will be able to continue as before.

Officials can refuse to comply with subpoenas until Trump’s term ends. And Trump can pardon everyone in sight, perhaps including himself.

But the next two years will not be defined by these struggles. I suspect that Trump’s approval will continue to sink to levels that increasingly threaten Republicans, particularly the 19 Republican senators who did not have to run this year because their terms end in 2029. The Republican presidential primary campaign will begin soon, and it will be ugly.

Significant events will occur beyond anyone’s control. We could face a recession. China could invade Taiwan. AI agents could disrupt the Internet. Events of such magnitude will dominate the news, and Trump will address them without public support or trust. I would guess that his own morale will collapse. In any case, attention will turn to his would-be successors.

In our institutions and communities, many (not all) people took the 2024 election as a sign that the public had moved rightward. We were coming off a period in which a certain kind of identity-focused, left-of-center politics had been influential. A shorthand for that view could be “DEI,” as long as we don’t focus on the actual meanings of the words “diversity,” “equity,” and “inclusion” but instead envision policies and practices such as diversity trainings in workplaces and land-acknowledgments. These practices can be criticized from many angles, including from the left. The backlash was highly effective and would have been less so if it had come only from MAGA and the Trump Administration. Within companies, universities, media outlets, and law firms, there were plenty of people who wanted to turn against what was called “DEI.”

But under the froth of symbolic politics–both for and against “DEI”–strong currents have been making the country actually more diverse, equitable, and inclusive. It is no accident that three governors will be Black for the first time in American history, that the first openly gay man and also the first Muslim will serve in the Senate, or that the first Gen-Z woman–an Ethiopian immigrant–will serve in the House. People who are not straight white men have been accumulating power, wealth, networks, and sheer numbers.

Consider Georgia, where a slight majority of the population consists of people of color, but voters were still 64% white this year. Nevertheless, significant portions of the white vote went for the Democratic candidates, along with about 90% of Blacks and 62% of all others. The state’s three most powerful elected officials will now be one Black man, one Black woman, and one Jewish man.

In the environment I know best (my own university and our city and places like it), there have been at least four reactions to the 2024 election. Some people have been terrified into silence. (Our beloved student was abducted by ICE, explicitly for publishing an anodyne op-ed, and many others have been directly affected.) Some people have been seethingly angry and have expressed their views privately or publicly. A few have been partly aligned with the MAGA movement. And there have been some strange bedfellows of the Trump Administration, including people who are concerned about intellectual pluralism and those who support the policies of the State of Israel. (For myself, I favor pluralism but am not willing to cooperate with the Trump people–and I am critical of Israel.)

All these groups have generally shared a feeling that Trump is powerful and that he has some kind of momentum. As those assumptions are removed, it will be interesting to see how various people react. I would expect a lot more of the seething anger, and I hope that it will prompt wise changes rather than sheer venting. Everyone should read Bayard Rustin’s “From Protest to Politics” (1965).

Similar debates will play out nationally and will be prominent in the presidential primaries of both parties.

In The Fall of Robespierre (Oxford 2023) ,Colin Jones narrates the dramatic events of July 27, 1794 (9th of Thermidor in Year II, according to the revolutionary calendar), which began with Robespierre as virtually a dictator and ended with him on his way to the guillotine. The people who brought him down were ideologically diverse, and some were concerned that he was about to move to the right. Nevertheless, during the subsequent year, a shared narrative took hold, according to which Robespierre had presided over a leftwing “Terror,” and the Thermidorian Reaction had moved the country to the center. That story became a reality, and the Revolution was never leftwing again.

Yesterday’s election was nonviolent, and it only directly affected parts of the government. Donald Trump started the day as president and still president today. But it was momentous enough that it can be compared to Thermidor.

As in that case, the main question will be: what sense do the people make of it? There will be progressive, centrist, moderately conservative, and MAGA interpretations, embodied by various presidential candidates. I do not know which one will get the most support, and none will achieve consensus. But I am pretty confident that the MAGA interpretation will fail. Only a few people will continue to believe that Donald Trump has popular support and Republicans were defeated because he wasn’t on the ballot. A near-consensus that he has lost the people will spell the end of his era.